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Abstract—In the era of Internet of Everything, massive connec-
tivity and various demands of latency for Internet of Thing (IoT)
devices will be supported by the massive Machine Type Com-
munication (mMTC). Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA)
and Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) have the advantages of
improving network capacity, reducing MTC devices’ (MTCDs)
latency and enhancing Quality of Service. Exploiting these
benefits, we focus on the energy efficient secure computation
offloading in NOMA based mMTC networks for IoT, where the
relay equipped with an MEC server and a passive malicious
eavesdropper are presented. We optimize the joint computation
and communication resource allocation to maximize the secrecy
energy efficiency of computation offloading while guaranteeing
the delay requirements of MTCDs. Furthermore, we model the
subchannels allocation problem as MTCD-to-Subchannel match-
ing. Exploiting difference of convex programming and successive
convex approximation, we formulate the Dinkelbach-based SEE
optimization algorithm and obtain the closed-form expression
of power allocation for MTCDs’ on each subchannel. Based
on the communication resources allocation schemes, we propose
the Knapsack algorithm to solve the problem of computation
resource allocation. Furthermore, we formulate the joint com-
putation and communication resource allocation algorithm for
secure computation offloading. Simulation results demonstrate
the effectiveness of proposed algorithm for supporting IoT devices
energy efficient secure computation offloading.
Index Terms—IoT, mMTC, NOMA, Mobile Edge Computing,
secure energy efficiency, joint computation and communication
resource allocation
I. INTRODUCTION
IN the coming of the Internet of Everything era, hundreds ofbillions Internet of Things (IoT) devices will be connected
to networks. Since the wide-area coverage capability, service
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cost and scalability of cellular network, it fits well for large-
scale IoT deployments that requires broader interconnection
capabilities [1]. Especially, as the main foundation of IoT,
massive machine type communication (mMTC) is considered
to serve billions of IoT devices in 5G scenarios [2]–[6].
The mMTC refers to certain IoT scenarios, where a large
amount of static sensors are deployed and report sporadically
to an application server in the cloud [7], such as Vehicle
Networks, Smart Meter Reading, E-health monitoring and
Smart surveillance. Ericsson predicts that around 3.5 billion
cellular IoT devices, i.e. MTC devices (MTCDs), will be
widely deployed by 2023 [8].
Because of limited resources in computing, communication,
storage and energy, it is hard for MTCDs to run sophisticated
processing [9] and satisfy the quality of computation experi-
ence in longtime working [10]. Soaring computing capabilities
are required to improve the security, analytic and connectivity
of MTCDs. However, the linear growth of cloud computing
capabilities cannot match the explosive increasing in massive
data that are collected from underlying MTCDs. Furthermore,
the massive MTCDs data will stumble the cloud computing
due to its shortcoming, such as high latency, security vulner-
ability, low coverage, lagged data transmission and limited
available bandwidth [11]. These noticeable challenges drive
the IoT data to be processed close to where it is produced
without being placed in a public cloud.
As a natural development in the evolution of mobile
base stations and the convergence of information technology
and telecommunications networking, mobile edge comput-
ing (MEC) was proposed by European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI) [12], which will be the impor-
tant enabler to inspire the development of myriads of MTC
applications and services. It aims at pushing traffic, cloud
computing capabilities and network functions towards the
edge of cellular networks. The International Data Corpora-
tion predicts that 40% initial IoT data need to be analyzed,
processed and stored at the edge of the network by 2019, and
IoT will generate 95% of the real-time data by 2025 [13].
With characteristics of MEC in low latency, proximity, high
bandwidth, location awareness and real-time insight into radio
networks information, massive data generated by MTCDs can
be efficiently executed by MEC server nearby the data sources.
This will reduce the congestions in core networks, improve
resource efficiency, increase the security of sensitive data and
significantly simplify the functionality of MTCDs to make
MTCDs cost efficiency.
However, limited available computation [14], [15] and com-
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munication resources [16], [17] will be a potential bottleneck
for supporting massive MTCDs in MEC. The MTCDs are
normally with low power and small size, which is traded off
by sacrificing their computing performance, while the compu-
tation tasks are generally intensive and latency-critical [18].
Although there are ultra-dense edge devices in 5G wireless
systems, including small-cell base stations, wireless access
points, laptops, tablets and smartphones, each of them are with
limited computation resource. It may lead to Quality of Service
degradation when many MTCDs computation offloading to
one edge devices. In this case, the execution time in MEC
server is non-negligible [19], because the less computation
resource allocated to the MTCDs may cause the violation of
their delay requirements. Furthermore, the limited available
spectrum resources also cannot accommodate massive MTCDs
to simultaneously connect the cellular networks for compu-
tation offloading or communication, due to the traditional
cellular network is mainly designed for traditional human to
human communication, rather not mMTC.
Security is another critical requirements of supporting
MTCDs in MEC [20], [21]. Although MEC offers a more
secure infrastructure than cloud computing, but it still has
its specific security and privacy challenges due to its unique
features. Due to the innate heterogeneity of MEC system, the
conventional trust and authentication mechanisms are inappli-
cable [22]. Moreover, the traditional cryptographic techniques
and associated protocols are usually not computationally af-
fordable for MTCDs (e.g., sensors in smart grid) [23]. Unlike
the wired connections in cloud computing, the computation
tasks offloaded from MTCDs to MEC servers via wireless
channel are more vulnerable to potential attacks due to the
broadcast natures of wireless communications. In worst case,
the MEC server may be a potential eavesdropping or jamming
attacker at the physical layer. For example, the malicious
attackers with tremendous processing power can decipher the
data overheard from MTCDs for launching security attacks,
especially, the data contains sensitive and private information.
Instead of orthogonal multiple access, non-orthogonal mul-
tiple access (NOMA) has been adopted into 5G New Ra-
dio by 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) [24] and
investigated by researchers in [25]–[28]. The NOMA not
only supports multiple MTCDs computation offloading in the
same resource concurrently [25], [26], it is also a diversity-
assisted security approaches of improving the security for
MTCDs computation offloading by exploiting the physical
characteristics of wireless channels [27], [28]. In order to
effectively protect computation offloading against eavesdrop-
per attacks, the finite computation-communication resources
should be well allocated in NOMA-based MEC to minimizing
the computation offloading rate of the wiretap channel, while
maximizing the computation offloading rate of the main chan-
nel. However, none of studies have investigated the energy
efficient secure computation offloading with consideration
of joint computation-communication resource allocation in
NOMA-based mMTC networks.
Due to MTCDs generally have strictly limited hardware
and signal processing capabilities, limited storage capacity and
significant energy constraints, they may not have the ability
TABLE I
NOTATIONS USED IN THIS PAPER
Notions Meanings
M, N set of MTCDs and subchannels
M ,N ,fT MTCDs/subchannels/computing capacity number
Nn maximum number of MTCDs in subchannel n
















Im,n,d, Im,n,e interference and noise
pm,n, qn transmission power in subchannel n
Pm,max, PB,max maximum transmission power





m offloading time/execute time/receiving time
Lm,Km data of computation offloading task/workload





M optimal power/subchannel allocation matrix
Y∗M optimal computing resource allocation matrix
q∗B optimal power allocation matrix of R-MECS
Ψ∗ optimal secrecy energy efficiency
λ, θ, ς Lagrange multiplier, power amplifier
ρ coefficient of residual self-interference power
∇xF, ∂F gradient of F of x, partial differential of F
mMTC massive Machine Type Communication
MTCDs MTC devices
NOMA Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access
MEC Mobile Edge Computing
R-MECS relay equipped with an MEC server
CRB computation resource block
SEE, SR secrecy energy efficiency, secrecy rate
DC difference of convex
to implement traditional cryptographic protocols. Physical-
layer security [29] aims at reinforcing the security (i.e.,
data confidentiality) of communication systems by exploit-
ing differences in channel conditions to prevent decoding
of messages from unauthorized users. Based on the secrecy
capacity defined by Wyner [30], the data confidentiality can be
guarantee if the achieved secrecy capacity is a positive value.
Therefore, by comparing the security requirements of MTCDs
and the potential benefits of physical-layer security, we see
that physical-layer security methods can complement or even
replace conventional cryptographic protocols as promising
solutions for mMTC.
In this paper, we study the physical layer security enhance-
ment for MTCDs computation offloading under eavesdropping
attacks in the NOMA-based mMTC networks, which supports
massive connectivity for MTCDs secure computation offload-
ing. Exploiting the various delay requirements of MTCDs
(cellular IoT devices), we joint allocate the finite computation-
communication resources to MTCDs for achieving energy
efficient secure computation offloading of IoT in NOMA based
mMTC networks. Our main contributions are summarized as
follows:
1) We propose a NOMA-based mMTC networks for sup-
porting IoT, where a relay with an MEC server integrated
(R-MECS) assisting the MTCDs secure computation
offloading and results forwarding. A passive malicious
eavesdropper with imperfect channel state information is
present. Based on the secrecy capacity, we define the total
number of secure computation offloading bits per Joule
to measure the secrecy energy efficiency (SEE) of system
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computation offloading.
2) Taking the various delay requirements of MTCDs and
finite computation-communication resources into consid-
eration, we jointly optimize the computation resources,
MTCDs’ transmission power and subchannel allocations
to maximize the SEE of system computation offloading.
3) We formulate the MTCD-to-Subchannel matching algo-
rithm and Dinkelbach-based SEE optimization algorithm
to solve the communication resource allocation problem,
and obtain the closed-from expressions of power alloca-
tion for MTCDs on each subchannel. Furthermore, we
solve the computation resource allocation problem by
Knapsack algorithm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section
II, we review the related works. In section III, we introduce
the IoT secure computation offloading with R-MECS assisted
in NOMA based mMTC networks. In section IV, we for-
mulate the SEE maximization problem for IoT computation
offloading. Joint resources allocation for maximizing SEE
is formulated in section V. Furthermore, solution of power
allocation scheme is given in VI. Simulation results and
conclusions are presented in section VII and VIII, respectively.
Notations used in this paper are listed in Table I.
II. RELATED WORKS
The myriads of interconnected MTCDs has a significant
surge in demand for computation resources. MEC and IoT
facilitate each other with mutual advantages [31]. IoT ex-
pands MEC services from smart meters to smart manufacture.
Similarly, MEC enhances the computational capacity of IoT
devices while saving their battery energies. MEC servers
performed as a gateway aggregate, classify and process the
data collected by IoT devices through computation offloading,
rather than directly transmitting them to the core networks
[32]. However, because of the synergistic nature of MEC
based on both communication and computation, computing
offloading is not beneficial for all IoT devices. Its limited
resources may lead the computation offloading with a large
execution delay due to the waiting execution time at the
servers or the communication delay from MTCDs to servers.
Therefore, it is important to balance the delay and energy
consumption in computation offloading with limited resources
constrains. The tradeoff between shortening execution time
and extending battery life of devices is investigated in [33].
Furthermore, based on Lyapunov optimization, the authors
proposed an energy-efficient offloading-decision algorithm to
balance the energy-delay tradeoff based on the criteria of
minimum response time or energy consumption [34].
Because separately optimizing the allocation of either com-
putation or communication resource is highly suboptimal,
joint optimization of radio and compute resources are studied
in [35]. Taking infinite and finite computation capacity into
consideration, You e.t. al [35] proved that the optimal re-
source allocation policy have a threshold-based structure with
respect to a derived offloading priority function, which yields
priorities for users according to their channel gains and local
computing energy consumption. Since massive MTCDs are
equipped with certain local computation and communication
resources, enable user cooperation among these devices in both
computation and communication is an efficient solution to
improve the MEC performance. The multi-user cooperative
MEC system are investigated in [36], where the limited
resources MTCDs can offload intensive computation tasks to
multiple nearby edge devices serving as helpers for remote
execution. Exploiting the benefits of NOMA based MEC in
supporting more MTCDs computation offloading with lower
latency and energy consumption, a group of MTCDs form a
NOMA cluster and simultaneously offload their computation
tasks to MEC server over the same subchannel [37].
Achieving security between IoT devices and MEC servers is
challenging, and both physical-layer and higher-layer security
mechanisms can be applied to protect the offloading process
[38]–[43]. Considered the eavesdropping attack when IoT
devices offloading computation tasks to MEC servers over
radio frequency channels, resource management for secrecy
capacity enhancement in OFDMA and NOMA is investigated
[38] [39]. Due to the limited attraction of traditional spectrum-
expansion-based schemes for the spectrum-scarce IoT devices,
the collaborative information sharing of IoT devices for online
security-aware computation offloading is studied in [40] to
resist the jamming attacks. Furthermore, exploiting the loca-
tion information related to the attack, the [42] formulate a
deep-learning based unsupervised learning model to automate
detect the security threats at the edge of cellular networks. To
overcome the high computation costs, low flexibility in key
management, and low compatibility in deploying new security
algorithms in IoT, the near-user edge device is employed as
a security agent to simplify key management and offload the
computational costs of security algorithms at IoT devices [43].
Ensuring security and privacy in IoT is particularly com-
plicated, especially for the resource-constrained IoT devices.
Therefore, integration of security mechanisms should be bet-
ter included in the MEC architecture, which has not been
addressed adequately in above researches. Although joint
computation and communication resources allocation [33]–
[36] and NOMA-based MEC system have been studied [25],
[26], [37], they have rarely considered the security problem in
computation offloading procedure, nor investigated the joint
resources allocation problem to guarantee the energy effi-
cient secure computation offloading in NOMA-based mMTC
networks. Therefore, to fully gain the benefits of MEC and
NOMA in mMTC networks, it is essential to study the
maximization energy efficiency technology while ensuring the
secure computation offloading of IoT devices.
III. R-MECS ASSISTED UPLINK NOMA-BASED MMTC
NETWORK MODEL
As illustrated in Fig.1, we consider the Relay with a R-
MECS assisted computing mMTC network, where a setM ,
{1, . . . ,M} of MTCDs, an eavesdropper and a legal receive
user are presented. The MTCDs with limited computation
and energy resources want to energy efficient secure offload
their all computation-intensive and latency critical tasks to
a R-MECS for executing, and the R-MECS forwards the
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computation results to the legal user. The procedure is named
as cooperative computing and forwarding. The eavesdrop-
per is passive and intercepts the information from MTCDs.
All MTCDs are uniformly distributed within a cell range
and equipped with a single antenna. Moreover, we consider
NOMA as an access method. Although multiple MTCDs can
share the same subchannel at the same time, they have to suffer
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Fig. 1. IoT devices secure computation offloading with R-MECS assisted in
NOMA-based mMTC networks
The cooperative computing and forwarding procedure has
two stages: secure computation tasks offloading and secure
computation results forwarding. In the stage of secure com-
putation tasks offloading, the R-MECS works in full-duplex
mode, which has the capability not only to receive the original
data from MTCDs through wireless channels and to execute
the computation tasks on behalf of the MTCDs, but also
to suppress the eavesdropping by transmitting artificial noise
to eavesdropper. In the stage of secure computation results
forwarding, the R-MECS has enough capability to encrypt the
computation results and secure forward them to the destina-
tion, which is beyond of the focus in this paper and do not
considered.
The computation tasks at m-th MTCD are characterized by
(Lm,Km, Dm). Lm is the data size of computation offloading
task. Km is the workload of m-th MTCD and measured by the
number of CPU cycles required to complete the execution of
the task, which is application-dependent. Dm is the tolerable
delay of m-th MTCD, that is the data should be processed
within this time. In practical, the available computation ca-
pacity of R-MECS is limited with small-scale [14], [15],
[35]. Hence, we assume that the computation capacity of
R-MECS is divided into NC different computation resource
blocks (CRBs), and each CRB is equal to C CPU cycles per
second [37]. The computation resources made available by the
R-MECS and to be shared among the MTCDs are quantified
by the computational capacity fT , expressed as numbers of
CPU cycles per second.
The available system bandwidth is shared by the MTCDs
using NOMA to support more MTCDs computation offloading
at the same time. The NOMA channel composes of N
subchannels, denoted by N = {1, . . . , N}, and each has a
bandwidth B. The noise power at the receiver of the R-
MECS is denoted as σ2. The R-MECS exploits its full-duplex
capability to conduct artificial noise to eavesdropper. However,
it also negatively influences itself in receiving information
from MTCDs, known as self-interference. We denote the
self-interference channel gain in n-th subchannel as gRn , and
the channel gain from R-MECS to eavesdropper in n-th
subchannel is gen. The channel gains from m-th MTCD to
R-MECS (destination) and eavesdropper in subchannel n are
denoted by hdm,n and h
e
m,n, respectively. We assume that the
R-MECS perfectly knows the channel state information and
the computation information of all MTCDs, but only partially
knows that of gen and h
e
m,n.
As commonly adopted in the physical-layer security lit-
eratures [38], we consider the deterministic CSI uncertainty













m,n. g˜en and h˜em,n denote the estimated
CSI of gen and h
e
m,nat the R-MECS, in addition, ∆g
e
n and
∆hem,n denote the estimated error that is bounded by a
possible value ε ≥ 0 as |∆gen| ≤ ε,
∣∣∆hem,n∣∣ ≤ ε. gen and
hem,n are the best possible channel gain of the eavesdropper
known by the R-MECS, and ε is also known by R-MECS.
Moreover, both distance dependent path loss and Rayleigh
fading on each of the subchannel are considered, such that
hdm,n = Dd
−α/2
m,d ~dm,n and h˜em,n = Dd
−α/2
m,e ~em,n, where
Ddm,d and Ddm,e are the distances from MTCD m to R-
MECS (destination) and eavesdropper. α denotes the path-loss
exponent and ~dm,n, ~em,n ∼ CN (0, 1) denote the normalized
Rayleigh fading. The block fading model is adopted, where all
the subchannels are invariable during a complete transmission
cycle and the co-channel interference among MTCDs on each
subchannel is considered.
IV. SECURE COMPUTATION OFFLOADING OVER
NOMA-BASED MMTC NETWORKS
A. Secure Computation Offloading Energy Efficiency
In R-MECS assisted computing mMTC system, each
MTCD offload their computation tasks to R-MECS by using
different subchannels, and each subchannel can be shared by
more than one MTCD simultaneously with actively introduc-
ing interferences. To reduce the complexity of receiver, an
upper limitation of the number of sharing same subchan-
nel is given
∑M
m=1 xm,n ≤ Nn,m ∈ M, n ∈ N where
xm,n = 1 denote the n-th subchannel is assigned to the m-
th MTCD,otherwise xm,n = 0.
When R-MECS works in full-duplex mode, it will bring
self-interference to its receiver and cannot be canceled com-
pletely due to the hardware limitation. We describe the residual
self-interference with the self-interference channel gain gRn as
a linear coefficient ρ [44]. The residual self-interference in n-th
subchannel is denoted as ρqn
∣∣gRn ∣∣2, and qn is the transmission
power from R-MECS to eavesdropper in subchannel n. Spe-
cially, for the self-interference, we assume E
{∣∣gRn ∣∣2} = 1,
n ∈ N .
Without loss of generality, we assume channel gains of
MTCDs on subchannel are perfectly known with descending
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order in destination channel and eavesdropping channel. The
achievable secrecy rate and lavage information rate in eaves-
dropper of the m-th MTCD in the n-th subchannel are given
by,
rm,n,d = xm,nBlog2 (1 + γm,n,d)
rm,n,e = xm,nBlog2 (1 + γm,n,e)
(1)
γm,n,d and γm,n,e are the signal-to-noise-plus-interference
















The computation offloading rate in the n-th subchannel of
MTCD-to-R-MECS and that of the n-th subchannel in MTCD-








Furthermore, the maximum achievable computation offloading
secrecy rate (SR) of each MTCD is given by the difference of
the MTCD-to-R-MECS computation offloading rate and the
MTCD-to-eavesdropper computation offloading rate, which




[rn,d − rn,e]+ (4)
Due to the low-cost and power-limited features of MTCDs, a
major concern is to secure computation offloading with limited
power and energy as much as possible. The performance
metric of secrecy energy efficiency (SEE) for computation
offloading needs to be maximized, which is defined as the
total number of secure computation offloading bits per Joule






which is the ratio of the total SR to the total energy consump-
tion. UTP is the total power consumption of all MTCDs, and











The transmission power consumption of m-th MTCD is∑N
n=1 xm,npm,n, which is not the only component to calculate
SEE for computation offloading, static circuit power consump-
tion PC also plays a significant role of SEE and includes circuit
power and processing power. ς ∈ [0, 1] is a constant value
which accounts for the power amplifier efficiency.
B. MEC Server Scheduling
The maximum tolerable delay Dm of m-th MTCD incorpo-
rates the time of offloading tasks to MEC server for executing,
which are the time for computation tasks offloading from m-
th MTCD to MEC server tTm, the time necessary for MEC
server executing tCm and the time for legal user receiving













. ym represents computing
resources assigned to m-th MTCD, and they are subject to
the computational budget constraint
∑M
m=1 ym ≤ fT .
In general, R-MECS has enough energy to transmit com-
putation results with small size to legal users, we assume that
the time for legal users to receive the computed results is
negligible [26], i.e., tRm = 0. Thus, the total secure computa-
tion offloading time and execution time of m-th MTCD’s task
should be no larger than its maximum tolerable delay Dm
tTm + t
C
m ≤ Dm (7)
The maximum tolerable delay constraint in (7) is what cou-
ples computation and communication optimization variables,
which motivates a joint optimization of computation resource
and communication resource. The total execution time in (7) is
equivalent to the following minimum computation offloading
SR requirement UmSC ≥ LmDm−tCm where t
C
m < Dm. Due to
the constraints of the minimum computation offloading SR,
the overall network performance in terms of SEE may be
degraded.
C. Optimization Problem Formulation
The power allocation scheme of MTCDs P∗M , subchannel
allocation scheme X∗M , computation resource allocation Y
∗
M













xm,n ≤ Nn,m ∈M, n ∈ N












xm,npm,n ≤ Pm,max,m ∈M
C8 : qn ≥ 0, n ∈ N
C9 : pm,n ≥ 0,m ∈M, n ∈ N
(8)
where C1 represents the minimum computation offloading SR
requirements for each MTCD to meet the maximum tolerable
delay constraint; C2 imposes a limitation on the task execution
time tCm with the delay limitation Dm; C3 ensures the total
number of MTCDs sharing the same subchannel is not exceed
Nn and C4 restricts xm,n is a binary variable; C5 is the
limitation of the computation resource in MEC server available
to the MTCDs, C6 and C7 are the power budget constraints
of R-MECS and MTCDs, respectively; Moreover, C8 and C9
guarantee the transmission power of R-MECS and MTCDs to
be positive values.
In general, depending on the MTCDs’ requests, channel
state and computation capability, not all requests can be
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Fig. 2. The Relationship between the Following Proposed Algorithm
accommodated. The C1-C9 can be enforced by a proper
admission control scheme through solving P1. However, the
introduced co-channel interference in NOMA system leads
a coupling among all MTCDs, which makes the objective
function in P1 is a ratio between a nonconvex function and
an affine function. In addition, the subchannel indicator is
binary variable. Thus, P1 is classified into a non-convex mixed
integer nonlinear fractional programming problem, which is
non-polynomial problem. The optimal SEE depends now
on both computation and communication parameters, such
as maximum tolerable delay, input size of MTCDs, CPU
cycle budget of R-MECS, etc. Different from the classical
secure transmission in P1, each MTCD’s secure computation
offloading rate has to meet the latency constraint in (7), which
means that a lowest secrecy computation offloading rate is
no longer optimal. Therefore, we develop computationally
efficient algorithms for SEE maximization problem suitable
to uplink NOMA-based mMTC systems. To clearly express
the relationship among the following proposed algorithms, we
make a high-level illustrative representation as shown in Fig.2.
V. JOINT RESOURCES ALLOCATION FOR MAXIMIZING
SEE
In this section, we will give a overview of the SEE
maximization scheme, which is obtained upon a two stages
resource allocation algorithm. In the first stage, SEE with
communication resource allocation is solved by an iterative
algorithm of joint subchannel and power allocation, where
subchannel allocation is solved by Match Game and power
allocation algorithm is obtained from fractional programming
and DC programming. The iterative radio resources allocation
for maximizing SEE is given in Algorithm 2, which is to
solve P2. In the second stage, to take full use of computation
resource and maximize SEE, the optimization problem of
computation resource allocation shown in P3 is modeled as
a dynamic programming and solved by Knapsack algorithm,
which is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
A. Knapsack-based Algorithm to Maximize SEE
Because MTCDs are energy-critical devices in mMTC net-
works, it is meaningful to discuss the relationship between
SEE and secure computation offloading time, and in order to
exploit the various delay requirements of MTCDs to prolong
the lifetime of MTCDs.
Theorem 1. The SEE of m-th MTCD is monotonically in-
creasing and convex in its secure computation offloading time
tTm.
Proof: It can be seen in Appendix A.
Therefore, making full use of the various delay requirements
of MTCDs can effectively improve the SEE of uplink compu-
tation offloading mMTC networks. Since the offloading tasks
must be offloaded to R-MECS within given amount of time
and little execution time left cannot complete the computation
tasks in R-MECS, the secure computation offloading time of
any computation task cannot be arbitrarily long. However,
constrained by limited computing resources in R-MECS, each
MTCD wants to be assigned as more computing resources as
possible, which will reduce the execution time and increase
secure computation offloading time under delay requirement.
It is essential to reasonable allocate the computing resources
to maximize SEE.
We take the confidential of computation tasks into con-
sideration in our proposed Knapsack problem. Moreover, the
joint computation and communication resource allocation for
maximizing SEE problem is reformulated as a Knapsack
problem, which optimizes the communication resource alloca-






















n=1 [rm,n,d − rm,n,e]+, η (YM ) =SEE.
In the proposed Knapsack problem, the R-MECS is seen as
a knapsack and the computation capacity in C5 is the volume
of knapsack. The computation resource ym required by the m-
th MTCD represents the volume goods to be packed into the
knapsack and the computation offloading SEE achieved by the
m-th MTCD is the value of corresponding goods ym. Different
from the Knapsack algorithm in existing researches to solve
the problem of computation resource allocation, the goods
have its value only when the required MTCD can guarantee
the confidential of computation tasks, i.e., the computation
offloading SEE achieved by the MTCD has a positive value.
Algorithm 1: Joint Resource Allocation for Maximizing SEE
Input:PM ,XM ,qB , {Dm, Lm},Nn, Nc
Output: SEE*
1:While |SEE(l1)− SEE(l1 − 1)| > ε1 or l2 ≤ L1,max
2: Calculate SEE based on the iterative communication resource
allocation for maximizing SEE algorithm (in Algorithm 2).
3: Based on C˜1, calculate the required computing resources ym
4: Perform computing resources allocation based on the
Knapsack algorithm.
5:End While
The P2 in (9) is a non-convex mixed integer non-linear pro-
gramming (MINLP) problem due the product term xm,npm,n
in objective and constraints of P2, where xm,n is a binary
variable. The MINLP problem is known to belong to NP-hard
problems and no efficient solutions exists because the com-
plexity may increase exponentially with problem size. This
type of problems is among the most challenging problems,
and obtaining the globally optimal solution is intractable for
mMTC networks. In this section, instead of directly solving
the MINLP problem, we transform the optimization problem
into MTCD-to-subchannel matching subproblem and power
allocation subproblem.
Algorithm 2: Iterative Communication Resource Allocation for
Maximizing SEE
Input: maximum tolerance ε2 and maximum iterations L2,max
Output: optimal secure energy efficient SEE∗
1. Initialization : the power pm,n for each MTCD and qn for R-MECS
2: While |SEE(l2)− SEE(l2 − 1)| > ε2 or l2 ≤ L2,max
3: Given the power allocation, update xm,n based on Algorithm 3
4: Reallocate pm,n and qn according to Algorithm 4.
5: Set l2 = l2 + 1 and calculate SEE(l2 + 1).
6: End While
By iteratively solving the two sub-problems, the system SEE
slightly improves at each iteration and will converge at last,
the detail procedure is presented in Algorithm 2. It finds at
least a locally optimal solution with polynomial time, which
has the potential to be a global optimum.
B. MTCD-to-Subchannel Matching Problem
The optimal solution XM of P2 can only be obtained by
performing an exhaustive search over all subchannel XM =
[xm,n] that respect the C3 and C4 in P2. There are at least
MN different subchannel allocation matrices to be evaluated,
which greatly increased the processing time in MTCD and
the computing complexities in MEC server grow fast with the
number of MTCDs. In the subchannel allocation process, the
MTCDs prefers to access the subchannel with good quality to
achieve the best service, while the subchannel allocation aims
at maximizing the system SEE by arranging right MTCDs
using the subchannels. Thus, in this section, we model the
subchannel allocation problem as a matching process where
MTCDs and subchannels match with each other to maximize
the system SEE.
Algorithm 3: MTCD-to-Subchannel Matching Algorithm
Input: pm,n, ym, qn , Nn
Output:optimal subchannel allocation matrix X∗M
1: Initialization Phase (Subchannel Selection)
Initialize the set of unmatched subchannels Ωu
For each MTCD
Calculate SEEm,n of each unmatched subchannel
Construct the preferable list PMD (m) based on SEEm,n
End
2: Matching Phase (Subchannel Allocation)
For each MTCD m
If the proposal set of m-th MTCD PMD (m) 6= ∅
m-th MTCD propose itself to its preferable unmatched
subchannel according to PMD (m)
For each unmatched n-th subchannel
If n-th subchannel has received proposal from MTCD m-th
Accept the proposal from m-th MTCD
End If
For each MTCD favors to n-th subchannel
Construct the preferable list PSC (n) based on SEE of
the accepted MTCDs
Assign subchannel n-th to its favorite MTCD with maximum
SEE and set xi,n = 1
End For
3: Updating Phase (Unmatched Subchannels Updating)
For each unmatched n-th subchannel
If
∑M




Let (MTCDm, SCn) denote a matching pair if subchannel
n is assigned to m-th MTCD. The unmatched MTCD set
is Ωu. The preferable matrix PMD of MTCDs record their
preferable subchannel sequence ranked by affordable SEE in
each subchannel, i.e. SEEm,n. The preferable matrix PMD
is constructed at the beginning of the matching, and will not
be changed throughout the matching process. It guarantees the
matching algorithm is low complexity and operability, and is
same as the conventional Gale-Shapley algorithm. However,
the preferable matrix PSC based on the achieved secure
energy efficiency SEEn on itself are unreducible in static
matching iterations, because there is interdependence relation-
ship between the MTCDs who share the same subchannel
in matching algorithm. To further reduce the complexity, the
preferable matrix PSC of subchannels is not constructed in
advance.
In this matching model, each MTCD makes their decisions
first according to their own preferable matrix PMD (m).
In each round of proposals from source nodes, each MTCD
proposes itself to at most one subchannel and then wait for
the response from the unmatched subchannels. The unmatched
subchannels accept all proposals from MTCDs and construct
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their preferable matrix PSC based on the SEE of each MTCD.
The subchannel will assign its favorite MTCD with maximum
SEE to sharing itself, and the unassigned MTCD on this
subchannel will reselect the new subchannel. The detailed
entire process of MTCD-Subchannel matching algorithm are
described in Algorithm 3, which consist of initialization
phase, matching phase and updating phase.
C. Power Allocation Algorithm for Maximizing SEE
Without loss of generality, we define the maximum SEE,
of P2 in (13) as Ψ*. Based on the fractional programming ,
the primary problem is associated with a parametric program















Theorem 2. The maximum SEE can be achieved only when










Proof: It can be seen in Appendix B.
To solving (12) with an equivalent objective function,
we propose a Dinkelbach-based SEE optimization algorithm,
which is shown in Algorithm 4. The iterative approach
presented in the Dinkelbach-based SEE optimization algorithm
provides closer approximations to the optimal SEE at each
iteration, stopping when a fixed convergence error ε4 or
the maximum of iterations L4,SEE is achieved. The objective




USC (PM ,qB)−Ψ(l)UTP (PM ,qB)
s.t. C6-C9
C˜1 : SRm ≥ Rm,min,m ∈M
(13)
where Ψ(l) is the temporary parameter used in the lth iteration
of Dinkelbach algorithm.
Algorithm 4: Dinkelbach-based SEE Optimization Algorithm
Input: ε4 and L4,max and l4 = 0


























































































) and l4 = l4 + 1;
10: End if
11: Until Convergence=ture or l4 = L4,max
VI. SOLUTIONS TO POWER ALLOCATION SCHEME
Although given the MTCD-to-Subchannel Matching
scheme, USC (PM ,qB) in optimization problem (18), the
sum of multiple rate function, is still non-convex optimization
problem with respect to pm,n. In order to reduce the
complexity of solving the power allocation problem, SCA
and DC programming are exploited to solve this problem.
We first establish a concave lower bound of user rate, which
is parameterized by a given power allocation P̂M [45],
log2(1 + z) ≥ αlog2(z) + β (14)
where α= zˆ1+zˆ , β=log2(1 + zˆ)− zˆ1+zˆ log2(zˆ), and the equality
holds when z = zˆ. By exploiting the rate lower bound, the
lower bound of data rate of the m-th MTCD-to-R-MECS
and that of the m-th MTCD-to-eavesdropper on the n-th
subchannel can be written as
r˜m,n,d = Bαm,n,dlog2 (γ˜m,n,d(Am,n,qB)) + βm,n,d
r˜m,n,e = Bαm,n,elog2 (γ˜m,n,e(Am,n,qB)) + βm,n,e
(15)
where A = P*M and r˜m,n,d (Am,n,qB) is a concave function











Am,n ≤ Pm,max,m ∈M
C˜8 : qn ≥ 0, n ∈ Nf
C˜9 : Am,n ≥ 0,m ∈M, n ∈ Nf
Co1 : S˜Rm ≥ Rm,min,m ∈M
(16)




n=1 [r˜m,n,d − r˜m,n,e]+
and S˜Rm (A,qB) =
∑N
n=1 [r˜m,n,d − r˜m,n,e]+.
A. Dual Decomposition with the Fixed SEE Ψ
Due to the nonconvex objective function and nonconvex
feasible set of P5, it is difficult to obtain the optimal solution.
We intend to solve P5 by exploiting dual decomposition. In
this way, the nonconvex constraint Co1 can be incorporated
into the objective function and the feasible domain is turn into
a convex set. Therefore, the DC programming can be exploited
in the next subsection.
If the constraint Co1 is eliminated, the feasible domain of
P4 will be convex and the problem will be decoupled. Thus,
we construct the lagrangian function of P5 as














where λ ≥ 0 is the lagrange multiplier. Then, the feasi-
ble domain of A,qB is turn into the convex set S1 ={
A : C˜6, C˜8,qB : C˜7, C˜9
}
.
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The sub-gradient method can be applied to solve the
higher level subproblem min
θ≥0
L (θ,A,qB) of (24) with fixed
A,qB . The gradient of L (θ,A,qB) with respect to θm is∑Nf
n=1 (r˜m,n,d − r˜m,n,e)−Rm,min, thus the dual variables θm
can be updated by






where φs is the positive step size at the s-th iteration.
The lower level subproblem max
A,qB∈S1
L (θ,A,qB) can be
solved when θ is fixed. However, due to the nonconvexity of
L (θ,A,qB) of both A and qB simultaneously, the lower level
subproblem max
A,qB∈S1
L (θ,A,qB) is still difficult to solve.
Therefore, with fixed A or qB , the alternate search strategy
can be adopted to solve the lower problem. In alternate search,
there is only one of A, qB optimized in every step while
others keeps fixed. In other words, we can find the solution











With fixed θ, L (θ,A,qB) is a concave function of qB ,
the proof of which is shown in Appendix C, but it is still
not convex of A. Thus, the optimal value qB in (20a) can
be found by Newton method, while the optimal value A in
(20b) can be obtained uniquely by DC programming in the
next subsection.
B. DC Programming for Power Allocation
Although L (θ,A,qB) is not convex with respect to A,
the key idea of DC programming is to convert a non-convex
problem to convex sub-problems by SCA and obtain a locally
optimal solution. By exploiting the DC structures, we convert
L (θ,A,qB) as
L (θ,A,qB) = F1 (A)− F2 (A) (21)























The objective F1 (A) and F2 (A) are continuous concave
function [46] on compact and convex set C˜7 and C˜9, it be-
longs to DC function programming. Thus, (27b) can be solved
uniquely by DC programming. Since F2 (A) is DC function
for any feasible point A(k), its convex majorant can be ex-









which is affine functions representing the global underestima-
tion of F2 (A).









The solution of DC programming problem in (23) is con-
cluded in Algorithm 5. For differentiable F1 (A) and F2 (A),
Algorithm 5 returns a stationary point of L (A), which is
proved in Appendix D.
Algorithm 5: Successive Convex Approximation for DC problems






1. Initialization : k = 1, A(k)
2: Repeat











4: k ← k + 1
5: Until
∣∣L(A(k+1))− L(A(k))∣∣ ≤ ε5 or k > L5,max
Although CVX can solve this problem, it will suffer
from the curse-of-dimensionality problem as the number of
both MTCDs and subchannels growing vastly. A Lagrangian
Primal-Dual based algorithm is formulated to solve this prob-
lem. Given the Lagrange multiplier λ and SEE Ψ, the optimal







Cm,nαm,n,e + ln 2
(


















Ci,n = (θi,n + 1)W
Proof: The proof can be seen in Appendix E.
C. Computation Complexity of The Proposed Algorith,
The computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is the
total computational complexity of the proposed scheme,
which including the computational complexity of Algo-
rithm 2 and that of Knapsack algorithm. The computational
complexity of knapsack algorithm is O(MfT ). The com-
putational complexity of Algorithm 3 is O(l3MN). The
computational complexity of finding optimal q∗B in Algo-
rithm 4 is O(lN), where l is the iterations of Newton
method. The computational complexity of finding the op-
timal P∗M in Algorithm 5 is O(MNl5). Thus, the total
computational complexity of Algorithm 1 can be computed
as O (l1l2l3MN + l1l2l4l5MN + l1l2l4lN + l1MfT ), where
l1, l2, l3, l4, l5 are the number of iterations in each algorithm.
The computational complexities of the proposed schemes
increase with the scale of MTCDs increasing.





Number of subchannels 50
Bandwidth of one subchannel 180kHz
Distance dependent path loss 128.1+37.6log10(d)
(dB), d (km)
Shadowing standard deviation 8dB
Fading Rayleigh fading
Max MTCDs in same subchannel Nn 2
Max transmission power of R-MECS PB,max 46dBm
Max transmission power of MTCD Pm,max 23dBm
Static circuit power PC 5dBm
Power amplifier efficiency ς 0.38
coefficient of residual self-interference ρ -110dB [44]
Noise No -90dBm [44]
Total computational Resource Blocks NC 30 [37]
Computing capacity of each RB C 10 Giga cycles/s [37]
Workload of each MTCD Km [0.5,1]Giga cycles [37]
Data size of computation tasks
for each MTCD Lm [5000,7000] bits [37]
Deadline of each MTCD Dm [400,500] ms [37]
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
In this section, we evaluate the SEE performance in MEC
assisted NOMA-based mMTC networks through Monte Carlo
simulations. The system parameters used in simulations are
given in Table II unless specificized stated, where the wireless
parameters are referred to 3GPP standard [47]. As the R-
MECS works in full-duplex mode, its effective distance is
150m, we consider one R-MECS located in the cell center and
M users are uniformly distributed on the circular range with
radius of 150 m. In the simulations, we consider a worse case
and set the distance between base station and eavesdropper
as 30m. In Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access
(OFDMA) systems, each user can only be assigned to one
subchannel. In NOMA systems, the maximum users can be
multiplexed on the same subchannel is Nn. Considering the
characteristic of MTCDs, we set the static circuit power of
MTCDs as 5dBm.














































Fig. 3. SEE for Computation Offloading vs. number of iteration
The convergence behavior of proposed joint resources allo-
cation for SEE algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 3. The proposed
algorithm converges after 5 iteration when M = 60, via the
update of computation resource allocation based on Knapsack
algorithm and iterative communication resource allocation for
maximizing SEE algorithm. With the increasing number of
MTCDs, although more MTCDs will join the procedure of
MTCD-to-Subchannel matching to maximize the SEE, the
increased iterations of the proposed algorithm are limited and
the total required iterations are not high.
We name the proposed joint resource allocation for max-
imizing SEE algorithm applied in NOMA system as SEE-
NOMA in Fig.3 and Fig.4. For convenience, we give the
explanation of the compared schemes in [35] [37] [38] and
other baseline schemes:
1) We take the offloading priority function scheme for users
in each subchannel [35] as a compared scheme, which is
based on the OFDMA system and called as SEE-OPF in
the simulation results.
2) We take the proposed schemes in [37] as SEE-
MENOMA, which aims to minimize the total energy con-
sumption in NOMA based MEC computation offloading
scenario.
3) Furthermore, we compare our proposed algorithm with
the schemes in [38] and name it as SEE-MENOMA,
which minimizes the energy consumption in OFDMA
based system while guaranteing the secure computation
offloading.
4) To study the effect of subchannel allocation, we name
the proposed joint resource allocation for maximizing
SEE applied in a conventional OFDMA system as SEE-
OFDMA.
5) Moreover, we name the scheme of substituting random
subchannel allocation algorithm for MTCD to subchannel
matching algorithm in the proposed SEE-NOMA as SEE-
RRB.
6) To study the the influence of computation resource al-
location, we name the scheme of replacing Knapsack
algorithm with the fractional computation resource (FCR)
allocation method ym = Km∑M
i=1Ki
fT in the proposed SEE-
NOMA as SEE-FCR, where fT = 300 Giga cycles/s is
the total computing resource.
7) We also compared our proposed SEE-NOMA algorithm
with the joint resource allocation algorithm for maximiz-
ing conventional computation offloading SR in NOMA
system, which is shorted as SR-NOMA.
The performance of SEE versus the number of MTCDs
is evaluated in Fig.4. The total number of MTCDs ranges
from 30 to 150 and the upper limit number of MTCDs
per subchannel is Nn = 2. As it can be seen from
Fig.4, the proposed joint algorithm, i.e. SEE-NOMA,
achieves higher SEE than other compared algorithms. The
SEE of SEE-OFDMA algorithm is higher than that of
SR-NOMA, which means that performing proper power
allocation can improve SEE. Although SEE-RRB is the
scheme to maximize SEE, its performance is the worst
due to the random subchannel allocation without schedul-
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ing. The performance of SEE-OPF [35] has lower SEE
than that of SEE-NOMA and SEE-FCR, which means
that offloading priority function scheme is not applicable
for guarantee the secure energy efficient computation
offloading. Furthermore, the SEE-MENOMA [37] and
SEE-MEOFDMA [38] have worst performances in SEE,
because they are not mainly designed for secure en-
ergy efficient for computation offloading in NOMA-based
mMTC networks.











































3.437x109 bits/Joule, a gain of 193.3%
Fig. 4. Computation Offloading SEE vs. number of MTCDs







































0.671x107 bits/s, a loss of 24.74%
Fig. 5. Computation Offloading SR vs. number of MTCDs
The achieved SR of different schemes is also compared
in Fig.5, where the simulation conditions are same with in
Fig.4. The optimization goals of SR-NOMA is maximizing
the SR while other schemes are maximizing SEE. Compared
with the achieved SR of the SR maximization problem, the
proposed SEE maximization leads to a certain loss of SR,
especially the SR of proposed SEE-NOMA has a loss of
24.74%. However, the SEE of SEE-NOMA scheme has a
gain of 193.30% compared with that of SR-NOMA (shown
in Fig.4), which means that the SEE-NOMA will securely
transmit more bit than other schemes with unit Joule. The
phenomenon is caused by the tradeoff between SEE and
SR. Because the computation resources strategy is the main
influencing factor when the number of MTCDs is smaller,
the SR of SEE-OPF [35] is larger than that of SEE-OFDMA.
While the proposed SEE-OFDMA outperforms than SEE-OPF
when the number of MTCDs is large, as the power allocation
strategy is the main influencing factor. As the performance in
Fig.4, the SEE-MENOMA [37] and SEE-MEOFDMA [38]
also have worst performances in SR. In the IoT era, it is
necessary to establish differentiated service mechanisms for
various requirements of IoT devices. The SR is applicable for
the rate-sensitive applications. While the SEE is more suitable
for energy-limited applications than SR, especially for massive
MTCDs who cannot be charged once their energy drained.































Fig. 6. Fairness index vs. number of MTCDs
With the same simulation conditions as in Fig.4, the
fairness performance versus the number of MTCDs of is
shown in Fig.6. Because fairness is an important metric
for resource allocation (with respect to both computation
and communication resource), we redefine the Jain’s fairness
index [48] with computation resource taken into consider-












SRm > Rm,min, Θ (SRm > Rm,min) = 1, it means m-
th MTCD has probability to perform computing offloading.
Otherwise, Θ (SRm > Rm,min) = 0, the m-th MTCD will be
refused to computation offloading. The fairness decreases with
the total number of MTCDs increasing, because more MTCDs
will compete for the limited resources. Different with the worst
performance in both SEE and SR, the SEE-MENOMA [37]
and SEE-MEOFDMA [38] have better performance in Jain
Fairness Index. The Jain Fairness Index of SEE-MEOFDMA
is highest, because it actually maximizes the transmission rate
without taking security into consideration when obtaining the
optimal power allocation in equation (10) of reference [38].
Furthermore, the SEE-OPF and SEE-MENOMA has also have
better performance in Jain Fairness Index, because they also
did not consider the restrictions of security. Due to SR-NOMA
aims to maximizing the secrecy rate, the number of MTCDs
that meet the requirement of Θ (SRm > Rm,min) is bigger
than that of algorithms maximizing SEE, which lead to a fairer
state than other algorithms. Since the algorithms maximizing
SEE have same characteristic in Θ (SRm > Rm,min), the
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trend of fairness index is similar with Fig.4, i.e. SEE-NOMA
> SEE-FCR > SEE-OFDMA > SEE-RRB.
The SEE with respect to the maximum transmission power
PMTCD,max of each MTCD is demonstrated in Fig.7. Due to
the MTCDs are energy-critical devices, we set PMTCD,max as
10 dBm, 23 dBm and 30 dBm in order not to exceed that
of H2H users. With the number of MTCDs is fixed, the SEE
increases when the maximum transmission power of MTCDs
increases, which illustrate that the system secrecy computation
offloading rate grows faster than the total power consumption
in our proposed algorithm. Although the larger transmission
power will enhance the secrecy performance, it also aggravates
the co-channel interference. Thus, the increased SEE between
Pm,max = 23 dBm and Pm,max = 10 dBm is larger than that
between Pm,max = 23 dBm and Pm,max = 30 dBm.















































Fig. 7. Computation Offloading SEE vs. maximum transmission power of
MTCDs

















































Fig. 8. Computation Offloading SEE vs. static circuit power of MTCDs
The performance of SEE versus the static circuit power PC
of each MTCD is shown in Fig.8. The static circuit power
of MTCDs varies from 0dBm to 15dBm. With the number
of MTCDs and maximum transmission power fixed, the SEE
decreases with the static circuit power increasing. In addition,
with the increase of static circuit power, the influence of
MTCDs’ number and maximum transmission power on SEE is
getting smaller and smaller, and static circuit power becomes
the main factor affecting SEE. Thus, the design of MTCDs
with low cost and low energy consumption is urgent.
The performance of SEE versus the total number of com-
putation resource blocks in MEC server is evaluated in Fig.9.
The number of CRB NC varies from 1 to 29. With the number
of MTCDs fixed, there exists a critical value of the number
of CRB. Particulary, the critical value of CRB in x-axis is
the number of CRB that can meet the computation offloading
requirements of MTCDs. The SEE increases when the number
of CRB is smaller than the critical value, and it will keep
constant if the number of CRB beyond the critical value. In
addition, the critical value of requiring CRB increases with
the total number of MTCDs increasing. The results imply that
the CRB assigning to each MEC server should be according
to the total number of served MTCDs.














































Fig. 9. Computation Offloading SEE vs. number of CRB














































Fig. 10. Computation Offloading SEE vs. workload of MTCDs
The performance of SEE versus the workload K of each
MTCD is evaluated in Fig.10. The workload of each MTCD
varies from 0.2 Giga cycles to 1 Giga cycles. With given the
number of MTCDs and total computation resource, because
the increasing workload will need more computation resource,
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which lead to the system SEE decreasing. Nevertheless, the
SEE can be improved by allocating more computation resource
to the MEC server, which need to be execute large high
concurrent computing workload.
The performance of SEE versus the input data size L of
each MTCD is evaluated in Fig.11. The input data size of each
MTCD ranges from 2 Kbits to 10 Kbits. To fulfill the con-
straint of maximum delay, the minimum secure computation
offloading rate increases with the increasing of input data size,
which lead to more transmission power to be needed. Thus,
SEE decreases with the increasing of input data size L with
given the number of MTCDs and total computing resources.
Furthermore, it can be seen from Fig.11 that the influence
of input data size on secrecy energy efficiency is smaller than
that of MTCDs’ number and total computing resources. As the
number of MTCDs increases, the total computing resources
has an increasing influence on SEE.














































Fig. 11. Computation Offloading SEE vs. input data size of MTCDs















































Fig. 12. Computation Offloading SEE vs. delay of MTCDs
The performance of SEE versus the maximum delay D of
each MTCD is evaluated in Fig.12. The maximum delay of
each MTCD varies from 50 ms to 1s. With the number of
MTCDs and total computation resource fixed, there exists a
critical value of the maximum delay, which represents the
minimum SR that all MTCDs can reach to, i.e., LD . The
minimum SR decreases with the number of MTCDs increas-
ing with total computing resources given, because limited
communication resource also have influence on SR. When
maximum delay is smaller than the critical value, the SEE
increases with the increasing of maximum delay, while it keeps
stable when maximum delay exceeds the critical value and
maximum delay is no longer the main factor to constrain
the SEE. In addition, when the total computation resource
increasing and the number of MTCDs fixed, more computation
resource will be allocated to MTCDs and the execution time
will decreases, which will prolong the computation offloading
time and increase the SR and SEE, thus the minimum SR
decreases with the increasing of total computation resource.
VIII. CONCLUSION
With the supporting for IoT in 5G scenarios, the R-MECS
was proposed to assist the NOMA based mMTC networks for
IoT secure computation offloading. By sharing computation
and communication resource among MTCDs, R-MECS can
support many MTCDs computation tasks execution at the
same time and meet the MTCDS’ various delay requirements.
Specifically, based on the defined SEE, the joint computation
and communication resource allocation algorithm was formu-
lated to guarantee the procedure of IoT computation offloading
securely and energy efficient. A MTCD-to-Subchannel match-
ing algorithm was proposed to maximize the SEE in solving
subchannel allocation problem. Furthermore, a Dinkelbach-
based SEE optimization algorithm was proposed by exploiting
SCA and DC programming, and the closed-form expressions
of power allocation for MTCDs’ on each subchannel were ob-
tained. Given the communication resource allocation schemes,
the computation resource allocation problem was solved by the
Knapsack algorithm. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed
algorithms and the influence of computation-communication
parameters on SEE has been evaluated via simulations.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: Here, we investigate the relationship between
secrecy energy efficiency and secure offloading transmission
time, where m-th MTCD with Lm,n bits computation task
need to be securely offloading to MEC through subchannel n.
The secrecy computing offloading rate is
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W − 1∣∣Hdm,n∣∣2 − ∣∣Hem,n∣∣22SRm,nW (27)



















) ≥ 0, SEE′m,n (tTm) ≥ 0, SEE′′m,n (tTm) ≤ 0.
(29)
It is easy to see SEEm,n is monotonically increasing and
concave in transmission time tTm, and SEEm,n can be in-
creased by increasing transmission time and correspondingly
decreasing power.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2















where P∗M and q
∗
B are the optimal power allocation strategies



















B)−Ψ*UTP (P∗M ,q∗B) = 0
(32)
We can obtain that max
{p∗m,n,q∗n}
{USC (PM ,qB) −
Ψ∗UTP (PM ,qB)} = 0. Thus, the sufficient condition
of Therorem 2 has been proved.
Then, the necessary condition should be proved. If





B) − Ψ*UTP (P∗M ,q∗B) = 0. Then, for any
feasible {PM ,qB}, we can obtain
USC (PM ,qB)−Ψ*UTP (PM ,qB)















Therefore, the optimal power allocation strategies
{P∗M ,q∗B} of the transformed objective function is also
the optimal ones of the original objective function.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THE CONCAVITY L (θ,A,qB) IN qB
Proof: When A = P*M , L (θ,A,qB) = USC (A,qB)−
ΨUTP (A,qB) +
∑M














































Furthermorethe second derivative of f1, f2, f3, f4 with re-















































2 ≈ 0 and ∂
2f2
∂(qn)
2 ≈ 0 if ρ is small enough, for






























Hence, L (θ,A,qB) is a concave function of qB .
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THE CONVERGENCE OF ALGORITHM 5



































) ≤ L(k)1 (A(k+1)) can be obtained by





increases when k increases. Because L (A) is optimize over
constrained resources set, there exists a limited iteration step
until it stops decreasing. Hence, the Algorithm 5 converges
to a stationary point and outputs optimal power allocation.
APPENDIX E
DERIVATION OF OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION
STRATEGIES IN EQUATION (24)
Proof: For each subchannel n, the channel gains are
sorted as
∣∣hd1,n∣∣2 ≥ · · · ∣∣hdm,n∣∣2 ≥ · · · ≥ ∣∣hdMn,n∣∣2 and∣∣he1′,n∣∣2 ≥ · · · ∣∣hem′,n∣∣2 ≥ · · · ≥ ∣∣heM ′n,n∣∣2, when m = 1,
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Therefore, by deduction, we have
∂L
∂Am,n
= (θm,n + 1)
Wαm,n,d
ln 2Am,n
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